Current research

My current research is mainly in applied microeconomics in general, and in the fields of industrial organization and public economics in particular. I am also interested in corporate governance, corporate finance, auctions, and many related issues.

Working papers

Initiative in public-private partnerships

Not available for download yet.

Structural estimation of switching costs

Joint work with J.L. Moraga-González. Not available for download yet.

Markets with interested advisors: On brokers, matchmakers, and middlemen

Joint work with M.A. Haan. Not available for download yet.

Welfare financing: Grant allocation and efficiency

Joint work with M.A. Allers.

This version: July 26, 2010.

Abstract

Welfare is often administered locally, but financed centrally. We analyze Dutch welfare grant allocation, where a sophisticated block grant system recently replaced a matching grant. Grant allocation affects the local governments’ incentive to reduce welfare dependency by using welfare-to-work programs and adequate enforcement policies. The new block grant aims at improving efficiency by increasing this incentive, without the disadvantage usually associated with block grants (inequity). We argue that the new allocation method can (to some extent) stop local administrators from being overly generous. However, under adverse conditions, the method may instead result in increased inefficiency, at least in some local governments.

Corporate Social Responsibility in a Corporate Governance Framework

Joint work with Y.E. Riyanto.

This version: October 29, 2009. An earlier version was published as IEEF Working Paper #2007/02 , 2007, and NUS Department of Economics Working Paper No. 0703, 2007, and is available at SSRN .

Abstract

We argue that Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) may affect the agency relationship inside a firm. We analyze how CSR and the threat of stakeholder activism influence effort of manager and shareholder, and describe how a shareholder may use CSR as a strategic device to alleviate the agency problem. We show how engaging in CSR may allow the shareholder to commit to less monitoring, thereby increasing managerial e¤ort and raising profits. Thus, even a socially indifferent shareholder can potentially benefit from CSR. He may even find it optimal to sponsor an activist, giving it the means to exert pressure on the firm.

Working paper version of forthcoming publication

Sound taxation? On the use of self-declared value

Joint work with M.A. Haan, P. Heijnen, and L. Schoonbeek.

This version: June 16, 2011. An earlier version was published as CeNDEF Working paper 08-02, University of Amsterdam.

Abstract

In the 16th century, foreign ships passing through the Sound had to pay ad valorem taxes, known as the Sound Dues. To give skippers an incentive to declare the true value of their cargo, the Danish Crown reserved the right to purchase it at the declared value. We show that this rule does not induce truth-telling, but does allow the authorities to effectively implement a given tax rate.

Other writings

As a PhD student, I followed the Nake  graduate program in general and quantitative economics. Two of my Nake workshop reports ( 'Vertical Contracting'  and 'Personnel Economics' ) are available for download.